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Professor Keith Sewell’s bulky doctoral dissertation, 
now packaged in a manageable and attractive book of  12 
lucid chapters, is an important study of  a body of  litera-
ture that must be considered intensely relevant for critical 
reﬂection on two areas of  academic work: the science of  
history and the humanities in general.  The book exam-
ines successive stages in the development of  the thought 
of  Butterﬁeld in relation to fundamental issues in the his-
torical discipline. Sir Herbert Butterﬁeld (1900-1979) was 
a Christian historian teaching in Cambridge; his proliﬁc 
output included such classics as The Whig Interpretation of  
History, The Origins of  Modern Science, and Christianity and 
History. His English colleagues always took note of  his 
publications, and on this continent he has been studied and 
commented on by such authors as C. T. McIntire, William 
A. Speck, and Kenneth W. Thompson.
Sewell has produced a sympathetic reconstruction of  
Butterﬁeld’s thought. This work is based on a painstaking 
analysis of  the entire published Butterﬁeld corpus, along 
with a judicious canvassing of  the unpublished corre-
spondence and manuscripts deposited with the Butterﬁeld 
Papers in the Cambridge University Library. The reader can 
be certain that nothing essential has been left unexamined. 
In a carefully nuanced way, Sewell lays bare the unspoken 
motivations and hidden tensions in Butterﬁeld’s continual 
debates, both with himself  and with a host of  contempo-
rary historians in the period between 1924-1979. In par-
ticular, the concept for which Butterﬁeld is widely known, 
“technical history,” is tracked down in his many writings, 
showing its initial purport, its gradual metamorphosis, and 
its ﬁnal integration (however problematic) in the whole of  
Butterﬁeld’s thought. In a chronological-genetic approach 
that is comprehensive ( if  not to say exhaustive), Sewell 
traces the steps by which Butterﬁeld, despite his champi-
oning of  non-interpretative “technical” history, employed 
deep-seated presuppositions and, more signiﬁcantly, 
the reasons that he did so each time. The problem with 
Butterﬁeld—and here Sewell appears to agree with the 
conclusion of  Louis J. Voskuil—is that he posited “a for-
mal dualism between technical history and religious inter-
pretation which tended to preclude consideration of  their 
inner connection” (12). The lynchpin of  Sewell’s critique 
is contained in a single sentence: “Evidence is never just 
seen, as Butterﬁeld tends on occasion to imply; it is always 
seen as” (215). The ﬁnal conclusion of  this study is that 
Butterﬁeld, in spite of  himself  and in spite of  his meth-
odological principles, was never able to escape the use of  
presuppositions in doing his work as a historian (213).
Can anyone trained in the reformational thought 
stemming from Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and others be sur-
prised by this conclusion? Long before the Sociology of  
Knowledge became a household word, Abraham Kuyper, 
in the great parliamentary debates of  1904, defended 
the inescapability of  subjective interpretation and there-
fore the perfect validity of  worldview-directed university 
studies, such as those given at the Free University, against 
the charge by Leyden professor Van der Vlugt that such 
studies were unacceptably “sectarian.” And decades be-
fore Critical Theory occupied Western epistemologists, 
Herman Dooyeweerd launched his transcendental critique 
of  theoretic thought against the charge that while human-
ist presuppositions in scientiﬁc work are rational, Christian 
presuppositions are “unscientiﬁc.” And, to name one 
more, independently of  postmodernism’s literary theorists 
and their call for deconstructing texts, S. U. Zuidema spe-
cialized in unmasking “the hidden player on the keyboard 
of  a thinker’s philosophy.” No, Sewell’s conclusion does 
not surprise us. What does surprise us is that he has to add 
that, although Butterﬁeld gradually went over to a more 
perspectival view of  scientiﬁc knowledge, he never “ex-
plicitly retracted his earlier teaching on ‘technical history’ 
. . .” and never “successfully confronted the ineluctability 
of  interpretation” (14, 213).
Butterﬁeld’s initial formulation of  his concept of  
“technical history” resembled a view of  scholarship or a 
philosophy of  science known as “naive realism.” Sewell 
shows, however, that in his own actual work as a practic-
ing historian, this erudite scholar was anything but naive! 
Butterﬁeld had a profound understanding of  human nature 
and the complexity of  the historical process, and his his-
torical writings are richly textured, didactic and evocative, 
allusive and suggestive. Yet over the years his pronounce-
ments on theory and methodology wove a tangled web. 
The present analysis deftly handles the twists and turns in 
Butterﬁeld’s emerging overall conception. Faced with the 
perennial questions about history and culture, he struggled 
to do them justice but repeatedly got himself  entangled in 
inconsistencies and partial retractions expressed in vague, 
obscure, at times tortuous prose.
It appears that Butterﬁeld felt obliged to protect the 
integrity of  historical science against the ideological on-
slaughts on the discipline by Marxists and other utilitarian 
propagandists. Sewell devotes all of  Chapter 8 to this is-
sue. In Butterﬁeld’s eyes, interpretation often lapses into 
misrepresenting, distorting, and oversimplifying historical 
reality. Hence it must be barred from academic history.
In taking this stance Butterﬁeld was for a while deceived 
by a particular reading, common in the English-speak-
ing world for close to a century, of  Leopold von Ranke. 
Ranke’s celebrated method was understood to mean that 
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respectable scientiﬁc history must limit itself  to establish-
ing naked facts and discrete events for the sake of  arriv-
ing at “pure science” free from overarching interpretations 
extraneous to the evidence. Sewell notes that Butterﬁeld 
imputes to Ranke “an almost Baconian notion of  factu-
ality” (168; see also 114). Could it be, I have often won-
dered, that this Baconianism, together with the Occamist 
emphasis on discreteness independent of  general catego-
ries, became part of  a long-standing English intellectual 
tradition? And could it be that Butterﬁeld accordingly en-
tertained an undue respect for the rise of  modern science? 
Nothing startled me as much, and in the end convinced 
me as little, as the statement in his book on the subject 
that the Scientiﬁc Revolution “outshines everything since 
the rise of  Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and 
Reformation to the rank of  mere episodes”(vii).
Butterﬁeld’s approach matured as he began to recog-
nize Ranke’s emphasis on collective tendencies and uni-
versal patterns and learned to incorporate these, however 
haltingly and falteringly, in his theorizing about proper 
methodology (not that he had not practiced this broader 
vision in his own historical writings all along). A distinct 
merit of  this study is that we are shown in what sense 
Butterﬁeld’s professional practice as a historian was much 
better—far richer—than  his theory warranted. As Sewell 
remarks, Butterﬁeld was a subtle thinker but not a very 
systematic one. The beauty of  his pilgrimage through the 
thorny paths of  historiographical theory is that time and 
again shaky theoretical expositions were offset by tacit 
self-corrections and increasingly more satisfactory elabo-
rations, in line with his own historical writings, of  what 
historians are doing and should be doing.
The story of  this struggle, covering half  a century, 
is fascinating. Butterﬁeld got caught in a tangle, carefully 
unraveled by Sewell, because he was a better historian 
than a philosopher and a better believer than an academic 
conformist. The tangle arose, Sewell explains in a merci-
ful understatement, “out of  his Christian, but conceptu-
ally inadequate, response to positions that he did not share 
and perhaps uncritical appropriation of  epistemological 
assumptions and methodological precepts that were not 
wholly compatible with his Christian worldview” (14). 
Butterﬁeld’s inability to ignore the presence of  a divine or-
der in the historical process—a providential order woven 
into the very fabric of  history—and his unwillingness to 
suppress his view of  man as a fallen and ﬂawed creature, 
simply did not allow him to conﬁne himself  to a value-free, 
non-interpretative zone insulated against “subjective inter-
pretation,” which transcends empirically veriﬁable facts, 
i.e. to conﬁne himself  to the restricted kind of  narrative 
prescribed by “technical history” as he had ﬁrst deﬁned it. 
As a result, the kind of  history he wrote as the years went 
by became more and more what Sewell calls “expository 
historiography” (see Chapter 5). This is a kind of  history-
writing that does not shy away from general concepts, pat-
terns of  interpretation, long-term consequences, and even 
moral judgments.
In this process of  articulating and constantly reformu-
lating his views, Butterﬁeld at one point used the metaphor 
of  “thinking caps”—three distinct mental approaches or 
vantage points that the historian may adopt as the narrative 
requires: factual, interpretative, or confessional. These too, 
however, did not prove to be the felicitous constructs that 
could ﬁnally resolve the inner tensions in his basic concep-
tion. In fact, he was forced to redeﬁne his constructs sever-
al times in a vain attempt to safeguard the historian’s prime 
role as he persisted in seeing it, namely to collect facts with 
an open mind free of  any “superimposed interpretation.” 
In this connection, Sewell cautions that McIntire’s gener-
ous interpretation of  Butterﬁeld is in need of  emendation 
(12, 204).  Sewell also seems to appreciate Hayden White’s 
analysis of  the explanatory patterns employed by histo-
rians, but he adds, wryly and wisely, “Perhaps the latter 
would have been more relevant for the present study if  he 
had addressed the fundamental question of  religious per-
spective rather than having discussed the issue principally 
in terms of  literary metaphors” (7). In another delightful 
aside, Sewell records that while Thomas Kuhn explicitly 
credited Butterﬁeld and his “thinking-cap” thesis for his 
own discovery of  ruling paradigms in the history of  natu-
ral science (13, 163), Butterﬁeld himself  in turn credited 
his inspiration for the idea to the indeterminacy principle 
in physics as expounded by Werner Heisenberg during a 
visit to Cambridge (161 n. 49).
As we follow Sewell’s tracing of  the many metamor-
phoses undergone by Butterﬁeld’s conception, we do well 
to bear in mind that this great British historian was the 
product of  the classic system in vogue in the British uni-
versity: you write weekly papers for your tutor, for you 
learn as you write and you write in order to learn. The typi-
cal English don has taken a page from John Calvin, a man 
steeped in the pedagogy of  Renaissance Humanism who 
wrote at the bottom of  his preface to the Institutes, quot-
ing St. Augustine, “I confess that I am one of  those who 
write as they grow in knowledge and who grow in knowl-
edge as they write.” With some people this work habit, for 
better or worse, results in an enormous output of  texts. 
McIntire has described the vastness of  Butterﬁeld’s literary 
remains. But the obvious fact that manuscripts are not al-
ways ripe for publication became clear in the critical recep-
tion accorded Butterﬁeld’s posthumous book The Origins of  
History, edited by his long-time friend Adam Watson.
Sewell’s book reads well, but I deplore the absence of  
subheadings within each chapter, which can be so helpful 
for the reader to keep his bearings. Equally deplorable, to 
my taste, is the absence of  all annotation at the foot of  
the page: we have to settle for thirty-ﬁve continuous pages 
of  endnotes (217-251); one would think that modern elec-
tronic typesetting has made this awkward convention un-
necessary.
The strengths of  this study are obvious, and I hasten 
to enumerate them. The work subjects Butterﬁeld to an 
impartial yet critical evaluation, teasing out the basic inten-
tions of  the man without pinning him down on a procrus-
tean bed of  apriori theoretical distinctions. Butterﬁeld is 
treated as a scholar of  integrity yet with serious philosoph-
ical blindspots. Particularly illuminating of  the questions 
at issue are the many interactions with other historians of  
which Sewell cites copious portions; we are given intrigu-
ing glimpses into the world of  British historians of  the 
twentieth century, from Acton, Temperley, and Gooch to 
Trevelyan, Namier, and Carr, and we can read their reac-
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tions to Butterﬁeld and to one another about him, both in 
the public press and in private correspondence. Another 
decided strength is that Butterﬁeld is allowed to speak 
for himself  in lengthy quotations from his many works. 
Granted, a plethora of  direct quotations is usually frowned 
upon and can be tiresome; in this case, however, one is 
dealing with a study in historical writing, and I would agree 
with Sewell that one needs to see just what Butterﬁeld 
actually wrote (9f., 15). Nothing illustrates Butterﬁeld’s 
thought processes and his “second thoughts” and “recon-
siderations” better than ipsissima verba.
The appended Bibliographies are a gold mine. The 
one that lists works by Butterﬁeld supersedes the extensive 
ones by Partington (1963) and Hinton (1972) and the cat-
egorial ones by McIntire (1979) and Thompson (1980).
A ﬁnal strength, surely, is the avoidance of  technical 
jargon. Any intelligent reader of  this study can follow what 
the professional historians are talking about. Accordingly, 
the book will be of  enduring value to historians interested 
in the foundational questions of  their discipline—and 
how could they not be interested in them?—as well as to 
philosophers and theoreticians of  history. It will also be 
found exceedingly insightful by students of  historiography 
and political theory. Its subject matter will remain topical 
because historiographical debates tend to have a long life 
span. Butterﬁeld has been out of  fashion for some time, 
but now that the inroads of  postmodernism have come to 
a halt and are beginning to recede, Butterﬁeld is due for 
renewed attention. My expectation is that Herbert Butterﬁeld 
and the Interpretation of  History will long remain a stimulating 
and instructive guide.
